This technical assistance document was issued upon approval of the Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
OLC Control Number EEOC-NVTA-2009-2 Concise Display Name Q&A-Understanding Waivers of Discrimination Claims in Employee Severance Agreements Issue Date General Topics Age, Remedies, Race, Color, Sex, Religion, National Origin, Disability, Genetic InformationThis document addresses severance agreements offered by an employer in exchange for waiver of current or potential discrimination claims. The document provides basic information about severance agreements, explains when a waiver is valid, and addresses w
Title VII, ADEA, 29 CFR Part 1601, 29 CFR 1625, 29 CFR Part 1626 Document Applicant Employees, Employers, Applicants, HR Practitioners, Benefit Providers Previous Revision DisclaimerThe contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
A severance agreement often is written like a contract or letter and generally includes a list of numbered paragraphs setting forth specific terms regarding the date of termination, severance payments, benefits, references, return of company property, and release of claims against the employer. If your employer decides to terminate you, it may give you a severance agreement similar to the one that follows:
Agreements that specifically cover the release of age claims will also include additional information intended to comply with OWBPA requirements. See Part IV.A, Question and Answer 6.
Example 2: This agreement is intended to comply with the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. You acknowledge and agree that you specifically are waiving rights and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Example 3: An employee who was laid off from her position at an automobile assembly plant agreed to release her employer from all claims in exchange for a $100,000 severance payment. After signing the waiver and cashing the check, she filed a lawsuit alleging that she was harassed and discriminated against by her coworkers during her employment. A court found that the employee’s waiver was knowing and voluntary by looking at the totality of circumstances surrounding its execution: the employee graduated from college and completed paralegal classes that included a course in contracts; she had no difficulty reading; the agreement was clear and unambiguous; she had ample time to consider whether to sign it; she was represented by counsel; the cash payment provided by the employer was fair consideration; and she did not offer to return the payment she received for signing the waiver. [9] Example 4: An employee was informed that his company was downsizing and that he had 30 days to elect voluntary or involuntary separation. The employee chose voluntary separation in exchange for severance pay and additional retirement benefits and signed a waiver, which stated: “I . . . hereby release and discharge [my employer] from any and all claims which I have or might have, arising out of or related to my employment or resignation or termination.” The employee later filed suit alleging that he was terminated based on his race and national origin. In finding that the employee’s waiver was not knowing and voluntary, a court noted that although the language of the agreement was “clear and unambiguous,” it failed to specifically mention the release of employment discrimination claims. Because the employee was only high school educated and unfamiliar with the law, his argument that he believed he only was releasing claims arising from his voluntary termination and the benefits package he accepted was “not an unreasonable conclusion.” [10]
Example 5: An employee, who had worked for his company for 28 years, was selected for an involuntary RIF and asked to sign a "General Release and Covenant Not to Sue” (severance agreement) in exchange for money. The severance agreement provided, among other things, that the employee “released” his employer “from all claims . . . of whatever kind,” including claims under the ADEA and any other federal, state, or local law dealing with discrimination in employment. The severance agreement also referenced “covenants not to sue” and stated that “[t]his covenant not to sue does not apply to actions based solely under the [ADEA].” After reading the severance agreement, the employee asked his supervisor if the exception for ADEA claims contained in the covenant not to sue meant he could sue the employer if his suit was limited to claims under the ADEA. His supervisor contacted the employer’s legal department and then sent the employee an e-mail stating, "Regarding your question on the General Release and Covenant Not to Sue, the wording is as intended. . . . . The site attorney was not comfortable providing an interpretation for you and suggested you consult with your own attorney." The employee signed the agreement, collected severance benefits, and then sued his employer for age discrimination under the ADEA. A court held that the severance agreement was not enforceable because it was not written in a manner calculated to be understood. [17]
Example 6: A release stating: “I have had reasonable and sufficient time and opportunity to consult with an independent legal representative of my own choosing before signing this Complete Release of All Claims,” did not comply with OWBPA’s requirement that an individual be advised to consult with an attorney. Although the voluntary early retirement agreement advised employees to consult financial and tax advisors, to seek advice from local personnel representatives, and to attend retirement seminars, it said nothing about seeking independent legal advice prior to making the election to retire and accepting the agreement. [18]
Example 7: An employee who received enhanced severance benefits in exchange for waiving her right to challenge her layoff later filed suit. In finding the waiver valid, the court noted that because the waiver clearly stated that she was releasing any claims that she “may now have or have had,” it did not require her to waive future claims hat may arise after the waiver was signed. [20]
If a waiver of age claims fails to meet any of these seven requirements, it is invalid and unenforceable. [21] In addition, an employer cannot attempt to “cure” a defective waiver by issuing a subsequent letter containing OWBPA-required information that was omitted from the original agreement. [22]
Yes. Even when a waiver complies with OWBPA’s requirements (see Question and Answer 6 above), a waiver of age claims, like waivers of Title VII and other discrimination claims, will be invalid and unenforceable if an employer used fraud, undue influence, or other improper conduct to coerce the employee to sign it, or if it contains a material mistake, omission, or misstatement.
Example 8: An employee who was told that his termination resulted from “reorganization” signed a waiver in exchange for severance pay. After a younger person was hired to do his former job, he filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination. The company then changed its position and claimed that the real reason for the employee’s discharge was his poor performance. The employee argued that his waiver was invalid due to fraud and that if he had known that he was being terminated because of alleged poor performance, he would have suspected age discrimination and would not have signed the waiver. The court held that fraud was a sufficient reason for finding the waiver invalid. [23] Example 9: An employee was terminated and given ten weeks of severance pay in exchange for signing an agreement waiving all of her potential discrimination claims. She later filed a lawsuit alleging that she was continuously passed over for promotion based on her age and sex throughout her employment. In response to the employer’s attempt to dismiss her suit, she alleged that the waiver was an ultimatum which effectively gave her no choice since she was her grandchildren’s guardian and her family’s source of income. The court held that the employee’s financial problems and prospective loss of her job did not constitute “duress” for the purpose of invalidating a waiver. [24]
Yes. Your employer may offset money it paid you in exchange for waiving your rights if you successfully challenge the waiver, prove age discrimination, and obtain a monetary award. However, your employer’s recovery may not exceed the amount it paid for the waiver or the amount of your award if it is less. [26]
Example 10: Your employer paid you $15,000 in exchange for a waiver of your age discrimination claim. You sue and convince a court that your waiver was not “knowing and voluntary” under OWBPA and that you are entitled to $10,000 in back pay and liquidated damages based on age discrimination. A court could reduce your award to zero because $10,000 is less than the $15,000 the employer already paid you for the waiver. Example 11: Same as Example 10, except that you are awarded $30,000 based on age discrimination. A court could not reduce your award by more than $15,000, the amount you received in exchange for the waiver. This means that you would still get $30,000 – the $15,000 your employer paid you for your waiver and an additional $15,000 awarded by the court.
No. EEOC regulations state that an employer cannot “abrogate,” or avoid, its duties under an ADEA waiver even if you challenge it. Because you have a right under OWBPA to have a court determine a waiver’s validity, it is unlawful for your employer to stop making promised severance payments or to withhold any other benefits it agreed to provide. [27]
Example 12: A company eliminated almost all of its direct sales positions and offered terminated employees six months of severance benefits in exchange for signing a waiver. In response to the employees’ suit alleging age discrimination, the company indicated that it was suspending any further severance payments and was discontinuing other benefits provided under the waiver agreement. A court held that the company could not cut off severance payments or demand repayment of benefits because the employees filed suit challenging the validity of the waiver. [28]
Typically, an “exit incentive program” is a voluntary program where an employer offers two or more employees, such as older employees or those in specific organizational units or job functions, additional consideration to persuade them to voluntarily resign and sign a waiver. An “other employment termination program” generally refers to a program where two or more employees are involuntarily terminated and are offered additional consideration in return for their decision to sign a waiver. [29]
Example 13: A bank must eliminate 20% of its 200 teller positions in a particular geographic location and decides to retain only those employees who most recently received the highest performance ratings. The bank sends a letter to 50 tellers who were rated “needs improvement” offering them six months pay if they voluntarily agree to resign and sign a waiver. This is an “exit incentive program.” Example 14: Same facts as in Example 13, but only 30 tellers voluntarily resign. The bank involuntarily lays off 10 tellers with severance pay in exchange for their waiver of age claims. This is an “other termination program.”
Example 15: If an employer decides it must eliminate 10 percent of its workforce at a particular facility, then the entire facility is the decisional unit, and the employer has to disclose the titles and ages of all employees at the facility who were and who were not selected for the layoff. If, however, the employer must eliminate 15 jobs and only considers employees in its accounting department (and not bookkeeping or sales) , then the accounting department is the decisional unit, and the employer has to disclose the title and ages of all employees in the accounting department whose positions were and were not selected for elimination.
The particular circumstances of each termination program determine whether the decisional unit is the entire company, a division, a department, employees reporting to a particular manager, or workers in a specific job classification.
See Appendix B for an example of an agreement issued to employees being laid off or terminated pursuant to a group exit incentive program.
[Please note: Appendix B was revised in April 2010]
The following example illustrates one way in which the required OWBPA information could be presented to employees as part of a waiver agreement and is not intended to suggest that employers must follow this format. Rather, each waiver agreement should be individualized based on an employer’s particular organizational structure and the average comprehension and education of the employees in the decisional unit subject to termination. For another example of how the required information might be presented, see 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(vii).
Although this sample addresses only OWBPA issues, most severance agreements also ask employees to waive all claims against the employer, including claims arising under any federal, state, and local laws. See paragraph 6 below.
This letter will constitute the agreement between you and [your employer](“the Company”) on the terms of your separation from the Company (hereinafter the “Agreement”). The Agreement will be effective on the date specified in paragraph 7, below.
You have agreed to resign on _______X_______ date. Your last day of work will be _______X_______ date.
[Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 may address benefits, unemployment compensation, references, return of property, confidentiality, etc.]
__________________________________
On Behalf [the Company]
By signing this letter, I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to consult with an attorney of my choice; that I have carefully reviewed and considered this Agreement; that I understand the terms of the Agreement; and that I voluntarily agree to them.
________________ Date: | ______________________________________________ [Employee] |
ENDNOTES
[1] When employers conduct a reduction in force (RIF), they often do so pursuant to “exit incentive programs.” For example, an employer may offer a one-time “buyout” to certain employees (e.g., “all hourly employees”) or an “early retirement” program to all employees who are already eligible for immediate retirement benefits to persuade them to voluntarily resign; or, it may carry out an involuntary RIF, where it lays off all employees in a particular position or division. See discussion in Part IV.B.
[2] The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against persons 40 years of age or older; Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), and national origin; Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against an individual on the basis of disability; and the EPA prohibits sex-based wage discrimination between men and women in the same establishment who are performing under similar working conditions. See https://www.eeoc.gov/laws-guidance-0.
[3] This document uses the term “severance agreement” to describe any termination agreement between an employer and an employee, whether voluntary or involuntary, that requires the employee to waive the right to sue for discrimination.
[4] Waivers of age claims are governed by OWBPA which provides a minimum set of conditions that have to be met in order for the agreement to be considered knowing and voluntary. A waiver of an ADEA claim, therefore, is not valid unless it satisfies OWBPA's specific requirements and was not induced by the employer’s improper conduct. See Part IV.A, Questions and Answers 6 and 7.
[5] State law typically governs questions regarding the proper construction of a severance agreement and the validity of waivers. For example, under the Minnesota Age Discrimination Act, a release must give the employee fifteen days after signing the agreement to change his mind and revoke his signature. Under California law, a waiver cannot release unknown claims unless the waiver agreement contains certain language specifically providing for such a waiver. Other states may impose additional requirements to obtain an effective waiver of certain state law claims. To determine whether a severance agreement is enforceable in the state in which you work, contact your state labor law department or consult with an attorney for legal advice.
In addition to waiver issues, workforce reductions or other substantial business changes often trigger additional legal obligations arising, for example, under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), relevant benefit plans, and labor contracts.
[6] See e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003)(“[i]n reviewing whether a waiver of prospective claims was valid, we apply ordinary contract principles”); Warnebold v. Union Pac. R.R., 963 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1992)(court applied “ordinary contract principles” in determining whether there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of claims).
[7] See e.g., Wastak v. Lehigh Health Network, 342 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2003)(courts must inquire into the totality of circumstances “to determine whether the execution of a waiver was ‘knowing and voluntary’”); Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2002)(“[i]n determining whether a release was knowingly and voluntarily executed, this court has adopted a ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach”). Even courts that apply ordinary contract principles generally consider the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release, the clarity of the release, and whether the employee was represented by or discouraged from consulting an attorney. See e.g., Whitmire v. WAY_FM Group, Inc., 2008 WL 5158186 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008)(in holding that a waiver was knowing and voluntary, a court noted that the employee was given at least 21 days to consider the agreement, asked questions that resulted in a revised agreement, sought advice from an attorney but disregarded it and decided to sign the agreement, had seven days after she signed the agreement to revoke it and chose not to do so, and admitted she understood what she was signing).
[8] See e.g., Pilon v. University of Minn., 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983)(where the employee was represented by counsel, the release language was clear, and there was no claim of fraud or duress, the release was upheld). Waivers that are executed by employees who were not advised to seek legal advice are more closely scrutinized than agreements entered into by employees after consultation with an attorney.
[9] See Hampton v. Ford Motor Company, 561 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2009).
[10] See Torrez v. Public Service Company of New Mexico, Inc., 908 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1990); but see Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988)(employee’s waiver was knowing and voluntary where he was advised of equal employment laws, encouraged to consult employee relations representative, and release specifically mentioned Title VII).
[11] See EEOC’s website for information on “How to File a Charge of Discrimination” at https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination.
[12] Agreements that prevent employees from cooperating with the EEOC interfere with enforcement activities because they deprive the Commission of important testimony and evidence needed to determine whether discrimination has occurred. EEOC guidance also states that obtaining a promise from an employee not to file a charge or assist in Commission investigations constitutes unlawful retaliation in violation of federal employment rights statutes. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waivable Employee Rights Under EEOC Enforced Statutes (April 1997); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(i)(2).
[13] Although your right to file a charge with the EEOC is protected, you can waive the right to recover from your employer either in your own lawsuit, or in any suit brought on your behalf by the Commission. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waivable Employee Rights Under EEOC Enforced Statutes.
[14] See Questions and Answers: Final Regulation on “Tender Back” and Related Issues Concerning ADEA Waivers, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-issues-final-rule-adea-tender-back-issue-0. Recognizing that older workers often need their severance payments to live on and may, in fact, already have spent the payments on living expenses, EEOC regulations clarify that the contract principles of “tender back” (returning the consideration received for the waiver before challenging it in court) and “ratification” (approving or ratifying the waiver by retaining the consideration) do not apply to ADEA waivers. See also Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998) (holding that because the release failed to comply with OWBPA, it could not bar the employee’s ADEA claim even if the employee retained the monies she received in exchange for the release).
Employers also may not avoid the “no tender back rule” by using other means to limit an employee’s right to challenge a waiver agreement or by penalizing an employee for challenging a waiver agreement. For example, an employer may not require an employee to agree to pay damages to the employer or pay the employer’s attorney’s fees simply for filing an age suit. Employers, however, are not precluded from recovering attorneys’ fees or costs specifically authorized under federal law. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23(b).
[15] See, e.g., Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F. 3d 666 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that employees bringing non-age claims might still have to “tender back” their consideration) and Hampton v. Ford Motor Co.., 561 F.3d 709 ( 7th Cir. 2009)(noting that because no exception to the “tender back” rule exists in this Title VII case, employee must return – or least offer to return—the consideration she received before challenging the validity of the waiver); but see Rangel v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., (holding that because the primary purpose of the ADEA and Title VII is to make it easier for an employee to challenge discrimination, employees bringing claims under Title VII should not have to return their severance pay before filing suit).
[16] See EEOC regulations Waiver of Rights and Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 C.F.R. Part 1625.
[17] See Thormforde v. International Business Machines Corp., 406 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Syverson v. IBM, 472 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (court adopted the reasoning in Thormforde when finding the same waiver used under different circumstances invalid).
[18] See American Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 1998) (to “advise” employees to consult an attorney means affirmatively to “caution,” “warn,” or “recommend”).
[19] An agreement can be signed prior to the 21- (or 45- ) day time period as long as employee’s decision is knowing and voluntary and is not induced by the employer through fraud, misrepresentation, a threat to withdraw or alter the offer prior to the expiration of the 21- or 45-day time period, or by providing different terms to employees who sign the release prior to the expiration of such time period. 29 C.F.R. 1625.22 (e) (6).
[20] See Budro v. BAE Sys. Info. And Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc., 2008 WL 1774961 (D.N.H. April 16, 2008).
[21] Although a waiver that fails to meet OWBPA’s requirements is unenforceable, a number of courts have refused to permit a suit based solely on an employer’s alleged violation of OWBPA requirements, holding that a failure to meet those requirements cannot create a separate cause of action under OWBPA and is not a violation of the ADEA. See e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 883 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 901 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1995); but see Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bull HN Information Sys. Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 1998)(holding that an invalid waiver can be an independent cause of action under the ADEA); in a subsequent proceeding, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bull HN Information Sys. Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D. Mass. 2001), the court clarified that although employees can bring a suit challenging a violation of OWBPA requirements, they cannot recover damages absent proof of age discrimination.
[22] See Butcher v. Gerber Products Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)(as a matter of law and public policy, an employer is allowed only one chance to conform to the requirements of OWBPA and cannot “cure” a defective release by issuing a letter to employees containing OWBPA-required information that was omitted from their separation agreements and request that they either “reaffirm” their acceptance or “revoke” the release).
[23] See Lauderdale v. Johnston Indus., Inc., 31 Fed. Appx. 940 (11th Cir. 2002).
[25] See 29 C.F.R § 1625.22 (d) (4). See also DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F. 3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995)(an employer may offer enhanced benefits to all terminated employees who agree to waive all claims against the company, without providing extra consideration to employees protected by the ADEA).
[26] See Questions and Answers: Final Regulation on “Tender Back” and Related Issues Concerning ADEA Waivers, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-issues-final-rule-adea-tender-back-issue-0; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23(c).
[27] See Questions and Answers: Final Regulation on “Tender Back” and Related Issues Concerning ADEA Waivers, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-issues-final-rule-adea-tender-back-issue-0; 29 C.F. R. § 1625.23(d).
[28] See Butcher v. Gerber Products Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
[29] 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f) (1) (iii) (A) (2005).
[32] An example in the regulations describes eligibility as: “All persons in the Construction Division are eligible for the program. All persons who are being terminated in our November RIF are selected for the program.” 29 C.F.F. § 1625.22(f)(4)(vii)(B). Some courts, however, interpret the term “eligibility factors” to mean the criteria, such as job performance, experience, or seniority, an employer relied on in deciding who to terminate. See Pagilio v. Guidant Corp., 483F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Minn. 2007)(the court held that a release violated OWBPA by, among other things, failing to identify the general criteria by which employees were selected for termination); but see Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 423 F.3d 1139, amended by, 446 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2006)(the court invalidated a release of claims because it failed to identify selection criteria as “eligibility factors;” however, in a later, revised, opinion, the court omitted eligibility factors as one of the grounds for invalidating the release and held only that the employer violated OWBPA by failing to identify the decisional unit).